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Jordan J. Paust*
I would like to begin by referring to some of the previous speak-
ers' comments. First, Professor Draper has justifiably asked why
human rights instruction should not occur more frequently within
the United States and other countries, especially within our educa-
tional processes.1 More specifically, we might ask why should not
law students become familiar with the human rights instruments,
especially those law students who might become judges in different
countries around the world." One aspect of human rights instruc-
tion which deserves more attention is the mutual self-interest or
common interest in implementing the conventions, s and, even
more fundamentally, in understanding the terms of the conven-
tions. An awareness of this mutual self-interest might aid in what
Professor Solf and Attorney Fruchterman would probably term a
functional reciprocity. Certainly the time to promote this added
Professor of Law, University of Houston.
For similar points made earlier by Professor Draper, see, e.g., Draper, The Implementa-
tion of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1978, III 1979
RECUEIL DES Couns 9, 20-23, 29 (1980); Draper, The Ethical and Juridical Status of Con-
straints in War, 55 MIL. L. REv. 169, 183-84 (1972). For similar points made by others
concerning instruction regarding humanitarian laws, see, e.g., Levie, 74 Am. Soc. INT'L L.
PROC. 148-49 (1980); Parks, id. at 149-50; Walker, id. at 151.
2 See also Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-the Fujii Case, 45 Am. J. INT'L
L. 62, 81 (1951), reprinted in R. LIILICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 96 (1979); Paust, Response to Terrorism: A Prologue to Deci-
sion Concerning Private Measures of Sanction, 12 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 79, 94-96 (1977)
(extending education programs to lower level educational institutions), reprinted in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 575, 589-90, 606, 633-37, 649-50 (A. Evans & J. Mur-
phy eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Paust, Response to Terrorism]; Paust, A Survey of Pos-
sible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment, and Coopera-
tive Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 431, 445-48 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Paust, A
Survey of Possible Legal Responses]; Paust, An International Structure for Implementa-
tion of the 1949 Gencoa Conventions: Needs and Function Analysis, 1 YALE STUD. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 148, 149-51, 169, 201-02, 204 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Paust, An International
Structure].
3 See generally M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUB-
LIC ORDER 408-22 (1980); Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal Responses, supra note 2, at 435-
45; Paust, An International Structure, supra note 2.
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attention is during the educational process.
Another useful point made by Professor Draper which I would
like to comment on is that human rights law regulates what a gov-
ernment can and cannot do to its own people. This is true,4 but
human rights law also regulates what a government can or cannot
do to other people, especially those who are within its jurisdiction.
A good example is the case of aliens. They are not necessarily loyal
to the government in whose territory they find themselves, and in
fact, may be totally opposed to the governmental structure as
such.5 In such a situation, human rights law regulates what the
government can and cannot do with respect to the aliens.
All of the panelists today have recognized that human rights
norms form a fundamental set of normative expectations, a funda-
mental set of legal principles upon which we must focus our atten-
tion. I share in that recognition, and I am in agreement with Pro-
fessor De Schutter that a general legal inquiry should begin with
the United Nations Charter, in particular with the human rights
provisions and the principle of self-determination. However, we
should also recognize that there is a whole package of humanita-
rian norms, or norms which serve humanitarian purposes, which is
applicable in times of internal armed conflict. John Moore might
prefer to phrase it differently and say there are many aspects of
this "Rubik's cube" of international law to which one must pay
adequate attention when deciding whether a particular law applies,
whether its application to protect certain persons is required, and
whether the law has been violated.
One norm that has not been mentioned yet, but which would
indeed be applicable in time of peace as well as in time of war, is
the customary prohibition of genocide6 and, more particularly, the
Genocide Convention and the criminal sanction provisions recog-
See, e.g., Paust, Human Rights: From Jurisprudential Inquiry to Effective Litigation,
56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 227, 235-38 (1981), and references cited therein [hereinafter cited as
Paust, Human Rights].
' See, e.g., supra note 4; M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 737-78
passim, and references cited therein.
' Today, this prohibition is considered to be customary. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 355-56; Henkin, Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States (Revised), Tentative Draft No. 3, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 653,
655 (1982), citing RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
702 (Rev. Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982); Paust & Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due
Process: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 6, 22 (1978) and refer-
ences cited.
306 [Vol. 13:305
CONFLICTING NORMS OF INTERVENTION
nized therein.7 The general norms of self-determination are also
applicable in times of peace as well as in times of war.8 The 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law9 recognizes not only
the right of a people to self-determination, but also what Professor
Blaustein and I termed in a Bangladesh context, the right to self-
determination assistance.10 Quite specifically, the 1970 Declaration
recognizes that in actions against, and resistance to, forcible ac-
tions which deprive a people of their right to self-determination,
"such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accor-
dance with the purposes and principles of the Charter." I suspect
that John Moore would underline the last portion of that sentence:
"in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter."
Nevertheless, there is an express recognition of the right to self-
determination and to self-determination assistance.
Another norm in the package of humanitarian norms which has
to be considered is the principle of intervention. In cases where the
right to self-determination assistance is recognized, intervention
would certainly be one form of assistance. I remember that it was
John Moore who taught us well at Virginia that "intervention" is a
term with many meanings,11 and that the United States, for exam-
ple, might be considered to "intervene" in a situation by simply
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). See supra note 6.
6 See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, supra note 6, at 11-12 n. 39, 18-19, 30-31; Paust, A Survey
of Possible Legal Responses, supra note 2, at 460-62; L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 496- 99, 535-36, 733-34, passim (1973); B. WESTON, R.
FALK & A. D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 321-22, 537-41, 555-62, 594-95
(1980); M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 346, 349; SELF-DETERMtNA-
TION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS (Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds.
1980) [hereinafter cited as SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMEN-
SIONS]; Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African Bantus-
tan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185 (1978); Suzuki, Extraconstitutional Change and
World Public Order: A Prologue to Decision-making, 15 Hous. L. REv. 23 (1977); Chen,
Self-Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HuMAN DIGNITY 198
(1976); Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Ter-
ritorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976); Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-
Political Inquiry, 1975 DET. C. L. REv. 71.
9 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (unanimous vote).
1o See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 6, at 11-12 n. 39, 38. See also Paust, Self-Determi-
nation: A Definitional Focus, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Paust, Self-Determination].
11 See, e.g., Moore, Intervention: A Monochromatic Term for a Polychromatic Reality, in
2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1061 (R. Falk ed. 1969); see also LAW & CIvIL
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (J. Moore ed. 1974).
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doing nothing. As one of the most powerful, influential and inte-
grated of nation-states in an increasingly interdependent world,
our actions and inactions can produce significant social conse-
quences abroad. Thus, the realistic question might not be whether
to intervene, but how to intervene and why. In terms of interven-
tion for the promotion of self-determination, I see no reason why,
for example, the Central Intelligence Agency could not engage in
otherwise permissible activities that aid self-determination
processes throughout the globe. Of course, other interrelated
norms applicable to human rights would have to be considered.' 2
Among the general norms to be considered are those which ad-
dress the general legitimacy of governments and the type of gov-
ernmental entity that can engage in legitimate activities, whether
these activities are otherwise lawful strategies of armed coercion,
or permissible derogations from certain human rights in times of
actual necessity. The precept of authority contained in article 21,
paragraph 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' s really
cements into human rights law the notion that no government is
authoritative unless it represents the will of the people." It also
recognizes the need for democratic elections, which is consistent
with the right of all persons to participate in a relevant social and
political process, a right included in the general norms of human
rights.' 5 Furthermore, the general precept of authority recognized
in the Universal Declaration is a key to a more policy-serving
treatment of the question of political oppression through strategies
of armed violence, "martial law," or "national security"
crackdowns.' 6
As Professor Draper and others have mentioned, the general
norm of nondiscrimination is also relevant to situations of armed
" See, e.g., Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign
Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 719, 758-65 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Paust, Is the President Bound?].
's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, para. 3, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 71 (1948).
" For further exposition, see, e.g., Paust, International Law and Control of the Media:
Terror, Repression and the Alternative, 53 IND. L. J. 621, 627-29 passim (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Paust, Control of the Media]; Paust, Self-Determination, supra note 10; Paust,
Human Rights, supra note 4, at 248-49, and references cited therein.
" See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, paras. 1-3, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). See also id. arts. 1, 2, 4, 6-7, 19-20, 28-30.
" See, e.g., Paust, Control of the Media, supra note 14; see also M. McDoUGAL, H. LAss-
WELL & L. CHEN, supra note 3, at 690-712, passim; Paust, Is the President Bound?, supra
note 12.
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conflict." One finds a cross reference to the norm of nondiscrimi-
nation, for example, in Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.1 8
This norm prohibits distinctions per se on the basis of race, color,
national or social origin, sex, and importantly, political or other
opinion. 9 General human rights, as well as the more specific
human rights and humanitarian provisions contained within the
laws of armed conflict, are applicable to all persons without dis-
tinction per se on the basis of ideologic or political belief, or on the
basis of the other forms of impermissible distinction.
Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter impose an obli-
gation on each state to take joint and separate action to achieve
"universal respect for, and observance of human rights." The
Charter also contains a fundamental prohibition of the threat or
use of force by a state, not only against the territorial integrity or
political independence of another nation-state, but in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations Charter. 0
Since the purposes of the Charter expressly include norms of self-
determination and human rights,21 it is certainly arguable that the
use of force by a state in a manner inconsistent with the norm of
self-determination is itself violative of the article 2(4) prohibition
of the use of force. 2 The Declaration on Principles of International
Law also recognizes, twice in the same instrument, that every state
"has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives" a
relevant people of their right to self-determination.
On the counterside of the equation, or the Rubik's cube of inter-
national law, are the norms generalized as the prohibition of inter-
vention. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter is one basis for these
norms. We see further recognition of this particular prohibition in
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. Article 3, paragraph 2 de-
clares: "nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification
for intervening directly or indirectly. . . in [an] armed conflict or
17 On the general norm of nondiscrimination, see, e.g., M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L.
CHEN, supra note 3, at 449-796, 909, 916-18, passim.
18 See Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, adopted June 8, 1977, art. 2, para. 1, re-
printed in 17 LL.M. 1442, 1443 (1977).
" See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 71 (1948).
"' U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. See also id. preamble, art. 1, para. 1; cf. id. arts. 51-52
(art. 51 reserves to Member States the right to individual or collective self-defense; art. 52
provides for actions by regional organizations for settlement of disputes).
" See, e.g., id. preamble, art. 1, paras. 2-3.
" See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, supra note 6, at 11 n.39; Paust, A Survey of Possible
Legal Responses, supra note 2, at 460-62.
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in [any] internal or external affairs of [a] High Contracting Party
... ."Thus, the question is presented: What are the internal or
external affairs "of" a particular country as opposed to interna-
tional affairs or matters of international concern? When does the
affair "of" a particular country become the affair also of others
and, thus, a matter of international concern? And when is there an
impermissible outside "intervention" into the affair "of" a particu-
lar nation-state as opposed to a normal day to day interrelation-
ship or interdependency of states and peoples? I would suggest,
like several commentators today, that article 2, paragraph 7 of the
United Nations Charter and article 3 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol
II do not prohibit intervention by the international community
into international affairs. At a minimum, they do not prohibit the
concern, investigations, and actions taken by the community in re-
sponse to violations of human rights or basic denials of self-
determination. s
I would now like to turn to article 29 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and the question of permissible derogations
from human rights norms. Yes, human rights norms generally are
applicable in times of peace and in times of armed conflict. Yes,
there can also be permissible derogations from human rights norms
in times of crisis, but the test is rather strict. The test of paragraph
2 of article 29 is necessity within democratic limits.24 The test re-
quires necessity under the circumstances, but also contains the sig-
nificant conditioning phrase: "democratic society." This phrase is
neither ideologically neutral nor irrelevant to self-determination or
the precept of authority that is also contained in the Universal
Declaration.26
If we look at the specific parts of the necessity test for permissi-
ble human rights derogations, we find that permissible measures of
derogation must be "determined by law" (i.e., that extralegal mea-
sures, perhaps even martial law decrees, are impermissible means
for derogating from human rights). Secondly, these derogations
must be engaged in "solely for the purpose of": (1) implementing
,' See, e.g., Paust, Tranasnational Freedom of Speech: Legal Aspects of the Helsinki Fi-
nal Act, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 66 (1982), and references cited therein; Paust, Fed-
eral Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity of Foreign
State Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23
VA. J. INT'L. L. 191, 221-25 (1983), and references cited.
For further exposition, see Paust, Control of the Media, supra note 14, at 626-29, 664,
passim.
28 See supra note 14.
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the relative rights and freedoms of other individuals, groups or the
society as a whole, and (2) meeting the just requirements of moral-
ity, public order and welfare. The words "solely," "and," and "re-
quirements" are significant conditioning words. They condition not
only the types of purposes that are permissible, but also the degree
of necessity that must exist (i.e., "solely for the purpose . ..of
meeting . . . just requirements"). 2a Thus, the "just requirements"
phrase provides the requirement of necessity that we see generally
in humanitarian law which prohibits unnecessary suffering and
military measures that are not reasonably necessary under the
circumstances.21
Third, the human rights derogation provision contains a limita-
tion that relates to a politico-ideologic process termed a "demo-
cratic" society. There is an express recognition that permissible
derogations can take place only within a democratic society. 8 In
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,29
one does not see this same "democratic society" limitation directly,
but there is an express reference to the need to serve self-determi-
nation.80 If I had more time, I would demonstrate further how self-
determination, the right of participation, norms of nondiscrimina-
tion, and the precept of authority contained in article 21 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are necessarily interre-
lated, and why they should also condition the derogation provision
found in article 29 of the Universal Declaration." l To return to
John Moore's. Rubik's cube example, all of these norms are neces-
sarily interrelated, -and adequate attention to each of these must
26 Id.
27 For exposition of the necessity test under the law of war, see, e.g., Paust, Weapons
Regulation, Military Necessity and Legal Standards: Are Contemporary Department of
Defense "Practices" Inconsistent with Legal Norms?, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 229 (1974);
Paust, Does Your Police Force Use Illegal Weapons?-A Configurative Approach to Deci-
sion Integrating International and Domestic Law, 18 H~Av. INT'L L.J. 19, 29-37 (1977).
" See supra note 14.
" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
80 See id. art. 1; see also Paust, Control of the Media, supra note 14, at 627 n. 29.
31 For now, see Paust, Control of the Media, supra note 14, at 626-29, passim. It should
also be noted that these concerns are also relevant to an adequate interpretation of the "by
all legitimate means" phrase in article 3, paragraph 1 of Protocol II. Legitimacy must cer-
tainly be tested with reference to the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights if only because the Charter must prevail in the case of any inconsistency, and the
Universal Declaration provides authoritative content with regard to the human rights provi-
sions of the Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103. Furthermore, the preamble to Protocol II
refers expressly to human rights instruments and, thus necessarily, to the Universal
Declaration.
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occur if we are more usefully to serve not only humanitarian law
but also other forms of international law in times of armed conflict.
